INTRODUCTION
Praise and blame have been poured on public choice in the fifty years of its existence. Some have welcomed the extension of economic analysis to government in that it allows analyzing public policy and markets consistently in one framework. Others, mainly political scientists, argue that the economic approach is carried too far and that it does not contribute much to an understanding of politics, while still others criticize that public-choice researchers do not push the economic approach hard enough into politics. Among the latter are economists such as Alberto Alesina, Torsten Persson, and Guido Tabellini.
In their opinion, not public choice but political economics is the right way to study politics from an economic perspective.
In this paper we want to compare political economics and public choice. In particular, we want to investigate whether the public-choice paradigm has been replaced by a political-economics paradigm, as the proponents of the latter claim. We start in section II by characterizing public choice as well as political economics, each from the point of view of its adherents. In section III we compare and evaluate contributions of both approaches to an economic analysis of politics in three particular fields common to the two -political business cycles, integration and secession, and constitutional political economy. A general comparison of public choice and political economics as competing scientific paradigms will be presented in section IV.
II THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PARADIGM AND ITS CHALLENGERS

II.1 The public-choice paradigm
The adherents of public choice trace the core of their approach back to two basic insights into the organization of the state. The first is due to Kenneth J. Arrow (1951 Arrow ( , 1963 , who showed that the state cannot be seen in analogy to a person, because the aggregation of individual preferences into a collective ordering runs into basic consistency problems. The second comes from James M. Buchanan (1949 Buchanan ( , 1954 , who offered the view of the state as a market in which individuals interact through exchange. The focus on exchange and not on coercion leads Buchanan to consensus among equals as benchmark for public decision-making. As real-world institutions and decisions generally deviate largely from this ideal, it becomes an important task for economists to offer a design for better institutions.
The contributions of Duncan Black (1948) on the median-voter theorem, Gordon Tullock (1959) on logrolling, Anthony Downs (1957) on representative democracy, Ronald Coase (1960) on social costs, and
Mancur Olson (1965) on interest-group activity have to be seen in conjunction with the work of Arrow and Buchanan. They all laid the foundations for a school of thought that is known as public choice and to 3 which nowadays a large family of researchers adhere.
1
The theory of science -following Thomas Kuhn (1962) -would classify the public-choice school of thought as a scientific paradigm within economics, as it contains all four decisive attributes of scientific paradigms. First, it shares basic generalizations (or natural laws) with economics, assuming that actors are rational and self-interested. Second, it is based on a common ontological or heuristic model resulting from the consistent application of the assumption of rational and self-interested actors to the realm of politics.
Third, its preferred method is the positive analysis of political institutions, and fourth, the common goal of public-choice scholars is to derive normative suggestions for improvements of political and economic institutions.
2 But a paradigm is never only an abstract concept. Kuhn stresses the general overlap of a paradigm and the research community that adheres to it: 'A paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share the same paradigm" (Kuhn 1962, p. 176) . Dennis Mueller (1985) demonstrates how well the public-choice paradigm, with the Public Choice Society at its core, fits this characteristic as well.
II.2 Challenges to the public-choice paradigm
Scientific paradigms rarely remain uncontested, and scientific progress often results from challenges to existing paradigms. Just as public choice challenged the 'social planner approach", it itself faces attacks from other schools of thought. Until recently there have been two main lines of criticism: one coming from political science, the other from the Chicago school of economics.
Political scientists like Green and Shapiro argue that public choice does 'little more than restate existing knowledge in rational choice terminology ' (Green and Shapiro 1994, p. 6) and contributes little to the understanding of real politics. But the criticism by these political scientists stands on shaky ground. It is not hard to offer evidence for new and important insights that were derived by public choice. We refer here to Mueller (2003, chap. 28) , who demonstrates by examples of public-choice contributions such as that by Riker on political coalitions (1962) or by Stratmann on logrolling (1992 Stratmann on logrolling ( , 1995 how an abstract analysis of politics by public choice was able to improve the understanding of real political phenomena.
Additionally, the fact that -far from political science driving public choice out of the analysis of politicsmany political scientists have discovered the analytical power of public choice and been converted from the traditional approaches of political science to rational choice can be seen as a good indicator of the 1 See, e.g., Grofman (2004) for a discussion of the foundations of the public-choice approach. 2 See Reder (1999) for a general application of the concept of scientific paradigms in economics. (Persson and Tabellini 2000) and -with respect to models in the realm of public finance -in their article (Persson and Tabellini 2002) . Earlier contributions with a focus on macroeconomic issues are Persson and Tabellini's Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics (Persson and Tabellini 1990 ) and the two volumes on Credibility and Politics edited by them (Persson and Tabellini 1994) , which assemble seminal papers on political economics. In recent years Alesina has contributed also, especially to the literature on integration and secession of states (e.g., Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Alesina and Wacziarg 1998) .
Political Economics and Public Finance
Affiliations and numerous joint authorships suggest that especially the works of Alberto Alesina, Torsten
Persson, and Guido Tabellini can be seen as representative for political economics, while many others (e.g., Oliver Blanchard, Dani Rodrik, Kenneth Rogoff, Gérard Roland, and Lars Svensson) seem to be sympathetic to the approach, share the way problems are approached by political economics, and hence often agree on a critical attitude towards public choice. We shall not, however, discuss their contributions, but rather concentrate on the core group of Alesina, Persson, and Tabellini.
3 We owe this point to Gebhard Kirchgässner (1991, p. 167).
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In contrast to the earlier critiques of public choice, political economics claims not to be just a challenger of public choice, but its successor:
'Political Economics has become one of the most active research areas in the last decades. Building on earlier work of the Public Choice school, rational expectations macroeconomics, and game theory, Political Economics has taken the next step by including rational voters, parties and politicians in the models.' (Persson and Tabellini 2000, p. xv; emphasis added) Public choice is seen as only a building block for the formation of political economics. Why that view is taken becomes obvious if one takes a look at the perception of public choice from the perspective of political economics that is presented, e.g., by Persson, Roland, and Tabellini: 'Traditional neoclassical theory is entirely normative and assumes a benevolent planner with a well-defined social welfare function. This has been criticized as a caricature by the Public Choice school, which argues that politicians rationally follow their self-interest. Positive Public Choice theory, however, typically relies on an alternative caricature: the malevolent Leviathan policy maker that replaces the benevolent Pigouvian planner and is solely maximizing her own rents. The voters' interest and the possible conflicts among them are generally disregarded, and political institutions do not play any part in the analysis. To put it more bluntly: both traditions lack micro-political foundations. Building a bridge between these two traditions -combining their main insights -is an important task for public finance. This requires addressing the above questions regarding how well democratic institutions align the interests of voters and the incentives of self-interested politicians.' (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1998, pp. 686-687;  emphasis added)
As public choice -in the view of political economics -is restricted to the study of the 'Leviathan' and includes neither voters, nor conflicts between them, nor political institutions, it becomes clear how political economics can claim the introduction of models that include rational voters, politicians, and parties to be 'the next step' in the economic analysis of politics.
For a public-choice scholar, however, this view is astonishing. How could one possibly overlook the public-choice research on representative democracies that dates at least back to Anthony Downs (1957 ), Gordon Tullock (1967 , Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 1973) , and Ashenfelter and Kelley (1975) and covers a huge variety of models, as e.g. deterministic voting models, probabilistic voting models, and legislative bargaining models that all include rational voters, political parties, and politicians? Indeed, even Anthony Down's 'economic theory of democracy ' (1957) To evaluate the possibility of a paradigm shift we rely on the concept of Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 1962) . In his view a paradigm shift occurs if a new approach emerges that is more plausible, is better able to explain empirical phenomena, and is in part or in whole incompatible with the existing paradigm (Kuhn 1962 , Lakatos 1970 . It is important to notice that this replacement occurs (as Lakatos pointed out) only if the alternative theory contains 'corroborated excess empirical content' over predecessors or rival theoriesmeaning that unless the new theory explains both what was explained before and new facts as well, there is no scientific reason to prefer it over the existing stock of literature (Lakatos 1970, pp. 116 et sqq.) . But this concept implies as well that once a paradigm shift occurs, large parts of the preceding literature become dispensable.
In the next three sections of this paper we want to assess the question whether the claim of political economics to be the successor of the paradigm of public choice could be legitimate. Does political economics really contain 'corroborated excess empirical content' ? Is it really superior to public choice?
Has a paradigm shift occurred, and is it therefore justified to neglect the public-choice tradition more or less completely?
III COMPETING PARADIGMS -APPLICATIONS
To illustrate the differences between the approaches of political economics and public choice and to assess their relative performance, we will compare their research in three fields common to both: political business cycles, integration and secession of states, and constitutional political economy. As the research in political economics and public choice overlaps in more than these three fields, the choice is not without alternative. We picked political business cycles because that was one of the first areas in which political economics contributed to the field of political economy. We picked integration and secession of states and constitutional political economy because political economics is currently most prominent in those fields.
By choosing the fields that are especially important within the relatively young approach of political economics, we hope to avoid a selection of topics biased towards an advantage for public choice. We shall argue that we can distill basic characteristics of both approaches based on their research in the fields 7 analyzed here.
III.1 The political business cycle
Public-choice economists criticized the social-planner approach for its unrealistic assumptions about the purely benevolent motivation of politicians and put the study of political failure on the research agenda of economics. Politics should be seen 'without romance' (Buchanan 2003, p. 16) . Politicians and bureaucrats are as self-interested as businessmen and use their positions to pursue their individual goals and plans.
One early line of research emerging from the study of political failure is the theory of political business cycles.
III.1.1 Public choice on the political business cycle
Public-choice research proposed mainly two theories on political business cycles: one by William D. Nordhaus (1975) , based on Bruno S. Frey and Larry Lau (1968) , and one by Douglas Hibbs (1977 and unemployment -given that the Phillips curve works, at least in the short run. Frey and Schneider (1978) pointed out that the two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive but can be combined. Parties have an ideology to which they adhere in general. Only when the popularity of the majority coalition (measured by popularity surveys) is below a critical level and elections are 8 approaching may the government compromise its ideological goals and launch an expansionary program in order to regain the critical votes for reelection.
III.1.2 Integrating rational expectations -the political-economics approach
One major criticism of the traditional public-choice theory of political business cycles has always been its implicit assumption that the citizens could be fooled by the government in every legislative term, over and over again. Therefore the early public-choice models of the political business cycle were said to be incompatible with rational expectations.
It is the merit of some of the first contributions of political economics to have shown that political business cycles can occur even if all actors have rational expectations. Persson and Tabellini (1990) presented an opportunistic model of the political business cycle. Alesina (1987) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) incorporated rational expectations in a partisan model in a two-party system. In the rational partisan theory 5 -which we have chosen as an illustrative example here -political business cycles result from uncertainty about the election outcome and hence about whether an expansionary or a deflationary policy will take place. The policy preferences are the same as in the Hibbs model. Left-wing parties prefer a looser monetary policy, while right-wing parties care more about inflation and pursue therefore a more restrictive monetary policy. In the wage bargaining process -which takes place only at fixed dates -the economic agents calculate an expected value for the inflation rate given the election probabilities of the major parties and their respective monetary policies. After the election the inflation rate is higher than expected if the left-wing party is elected, but is lower than expected if the right-wing party is elected. In the first case there is a boom until all wage contracts are adjusted to the higher inflation rate; in the second case a contractive period follows the elections. Over the time the economy needs to adjust to the new inflation rate, a political business cycle occurs.
III.1.3 Preventing political business cycles
As political manipulation of the economy to increase reelection probabilities focuses solely on the benefits of economic booms triggered by government spending or monetary policy before elections and neglects the necessary adjustment costs after elections, it can be expected to reduce overall social welfare.
Consequently economists have searched for ways to prevent the occurrence of political business cycles so as to suggest institutional improvements affecting the most important triggers of political business cycles:
the extent and the timing of government spending on the one hand, and monetary policy on the other.
The timing of government spending is very hard to restrict in a democracy, as it is an elementary function of the sovereign. But budgetary rules can nonetheless help to limit the extent of government spending and 9 therefore the government's ability to manipulate the economy by public spending. Von Hagen (1992) -who can't be associated clearly with either of the two schools discussed in this paper -has analyzed budgetary rules and derived suggestions for institutional improvements to at least partly control government spending decisions and thereby reduce governments' ability to trigger political business cycles. 
III.1.4 Evaluation of political business cycle theories
So how to evaluate the research in political economics and public choice on political business cycles? Is one approach better than the other?
Public choice deserves the credit for the 'invention' of the approach, but political economics contributed powerfully, based on the foundation laid out by public choice, by integrating rational expectations into models with appealing elegance and by deriving the most important suggestions for institutional improvements in monetary policy. But that does not necessarily mean that political economics ultimately makes its predecessors obsolete. If one conducts simple tests of a selection of theories of business cycles in the US from 1949 to 2000, one finds that the observable business-cycle patterns are much better explained with the classical Hibbs partisan model or the opportunistic Nordhaus model than, e.g., with the Alesina-Rosenthal model. 7 Therefore the rational-expectations models of political economics deserve praise for their contribution to the theoretical analysis -but they nonetheless remain in competition with the alternative and (at least sometimes) empirically better-performing models of public choice. Hence we see a healthy competition of both approaches to political business cycles, with some advantages for the political-economics school.
III.2 Integration and secession -explaining the size of nations
With regard to political business cycles, political economics contributes to a well-established line of publicchoice research. Within the study of integration and secession, political economics is far more ambitious 5 See for further reference especially Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, pp. 161 et sqq.) or Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997, pp. 51 et sqq.) . 6 See for an overview also Strauch and von Hagen (2000) . Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003) , Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) , Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000 , and Alesina and La Ferrara (2003 for Europe? Has the democratic deficit of the European Union to be praised because it might enable the EU to reach its optimal size? The authors of political-economics works avoid these questions -probably with good reason, as an in-depth discussion would reveal the nondemocratic nature of their approach and the limits of the real-world applicability of their concept of an optimal country size.
Furthermore, it is surprising that political economics borrows the trade-off between economies of scale in public-good provision and local preference satisfaction (both depending on the size of the jurisdiction) from the approach of fiscal federalism (see, e.g., Oates 1972) -which is traditionally used by public-choice theorists to study country formation -but largely disregards the possibility of a multilevel state, which might moderate or even obviate this trade-off. In reality, nearly all states of any size are organized on multiple levels. They consist of various overlapping territorial jurisdictions with different assignments of tasks and revenues. According to Tiebout (1956) , individuals may choose among jurisdictions by migration. Some authors go even so far as to abandon the purely geographical definition of jurisdictions and define them as functionally overlapping, competing jurisdictions (FOCJs), following the concept of Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger (1999) . Following the concept of FOCJs, each citizen could select his or her own desired bundle of jurisdictions providing public goods. In this case the trade-off between preference adjustment and economies of scale in public-good provision would vanish completely, as would any argument for collective optimization.
Alesina et al. realized right from the start the challenge posed to their theory of the optimal size of nations by the theory of fiscal federalism, 11 but have only recently added a chapter on federalism in their latest book . Even there, the discussion of fiscal federalism remains superficial.
They write: 'In this chapter we do not digress into the vast field of fiscal federalism, but rather cite what literature is appropriate to our perspective on political border formation' (p. 14). Indeed, a large part of the 10 Alesina et al. prove in a lengthy discussion that a transfer scheme lacking credibility is in general not able to induce an optimal size of nations unless incentives to secede are offset by strong economies of scale (see Alesina and Spolaore 2003, pp. 53-67) . 11 Alesina and Spolaore (1997) conclude: 'In other words, an answer to the trade-off between economies of scale and heterogeneity can be found in a decentralized structure of government. This line of argument would connect us to the literature of fiscal federalism, an avenue certainly worth exploring' (p. 1046).
literature of fiscal federalism is simply ignored. 12 And although Alesina et al. discuss the possibility of overlapping jurisdictions, they fail to acknowledge that the trade-off between preference heterogeneity and economies of scale cannot alone be the basis for the discussion of the optimal size of a country, as its federal structure has to be taken into account. But it seems that the authors in the school of political economics prefer to withdraw from this 'intellectual minefield' and to turn to a positive analysis of the size of nations instead.
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III.2.2 The optimal size of a nation: positive analysis
For the positive, empirical part of their analysis, Alesina et al. put the idea of an optimal country size aside and focus on the international trade regime, which they try to establish as the decisive variable to explain integration and secession. Their argument runs as follows: Under worldwide protectionism, nations will merge politically in order to achieve larger markets internally, even if they have to incur the costs resulting from centralized uniform public-good provision under increasing heterogeneity of preferences (which are assumed to increase with individuals' geographic distance from the center of a state and therefore with the size of the state). Under a regime of international free trade, in contrast, nations will split, as they can obtain the advantages of large markets without the need of being constrained by a centralized uniform provision of public goods. The prediction therefore is: A more protectionist international trade regime will lead to fewer and larger countries, while more free trade will lead to more numerous and smaller countries. (a) Political integration of 26 independent states into the German Kaiserreich in 1871 was scarcely a consequence of protectionism (as indicated by Alesina et al.) , as it was preceded by a long period of over 40 years of gradually increasing free trade among these nations forming the Zollverein (German customs association), beginning in 1828 and continuing with 12 See e.g. Oates (1972) , Wallis and Oates (1991) , Nelson (1986 Nelson ( , 1987 , Pommerehne, Kirchgässner, and Feld (1996) , and Oates (1985 Oates ( , 1989 . 13 Other publications of Political Economics on federalism are largely detached from the literature discussed here and do not remedy the criticized shortcomings in Alesina et al. See for example Persson and Tabellini (1996) and Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) . In our view fiscal federalism in this context is much more than the calculation of voter equilibria holding a union together under economies of scale and scope (as in Persson and Tabellini 2002, part 5) . Federalism is -like markets -a device to stimulate the search by self-governing jurisdictions for better solutions by trial and error.
13 the North German Confederation in 1867 up to 1871 and beyond. The turnaround towards protectionism came no earlier than 1879-1880, much later than integration, and it lasted up to World War II. 14 such as GATT and WTO, the number of free-trade-oriented national governments is decisive for the overall degree of free trade.
While our understanding of the determinants of national trade policy is comparatively well advanced, the second problem -the relationship of trade policy, free trade, and integration and secession -has so far been widely neglected. Nonetheless it is important for a convincing analysis to take the domestic determination of trade policy into account when analyzing the interplay of trade policy and integration and secession, instead of just assuming free trade to be an exogenous variable as Alesina et al. do. Once freetraders are in power domestically, it seems only logical to assume that they are not only interested in open borders, but also in making trade safer by promoting cross-border legal stability and hence advancing political integration. The more countries are promoting free trade, the more political integration we would therefore expect. If, however, protectionist interests dominate national politics, it seems rather unlikely that small nations will merge into larger ones as suggested by Alesina et al., and much more plausible that large nations will disintegrate into smaller ones; for protectionists fear large markets with competition [see case (b) above]. We would therefore expect an increasing number of secessions to be linked to rising levels of protectionism. Just by taking into account that decisions on international free trade or protectionism result from domestically made trade policy, we can therefore offer an explanation why the observable relationship between free trade and integration and secession is the opposite of the one assumed by Alesina et al.
III.2.3 Institutional improvements
That Alesina et al. are not able to explain what they intend to explain is one thing, but we see an even deeper problem in the inability of their theory to derive institutional improvements that could enhance economic welfare and individual liberty.
There is wide consensus that free trade is welfare-enhancing and therefore generally desirable. This motivates public-choice scholars to develop proposals for institutional improvements that foster liberal trade policy. Alesina et al., in contrast, do not have anything to contribute, as for them the international trade regime is exogenous.
Furthermore, political economics neglects, at least partly, the importance of individual liberty and individual preference satisfaction. The normative analysis of the optimal size of nations completely disregards individual liberty, as it rests on collective optimization. In the positive analysis Alesina et al.
focus on the alleged trade-off between market expansion and local preference satisfaction by public-good provision, but do not search for ways to solve this trade-off, e.g., by fiscal federalism or migration within jurisdictions. They do not even ask how institutions should be changed to increase individual liberty and to improve the individual preference satisfaction, and they have therefore little to contribute to the publicchoice literature on fiscal federalism, which has these questions in its core.
III.3 Constitutional political economy
III.3.1 The view of political economics
In their book The Economic Effects of Constitutions Persson and Tabellini (2003) write:
We would like to answer questions like the following: If the United Kingdom were to switch its electoral rule from majoritarian to proportional, how would this affect the size of its welfare state or its budget deficit? If Argentina were to abandon its presidential regime in favour of a parliamentary form of government, would this facilitate the adoption of sound policies toward economic development? (Persson and Tabellini 2003, p. 7) Questions of comparative constitutional analysis such as these have been studied for a long time by economists of public choice, e.g., in The Calculus of Consent by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 
or in
Constitutional Democracy by Mueller (1996) , and in the huge literature based on these contributions. Instead these authors prefer to cite their own work and the literature of political science, which they consult extensively. Hence they hold one eye open and the other closed, and it remains to be seen how far they are able to keep a perspective view despite their voluntary handicap of being one-eyed.
As the introductory quotation indicates, the authors want to compare the consequences of alternative constitutions in the world. Tabellini (2000, 2003) focus on two pairs of characteristics:
majoritarian versus proportional electoral systems, and presidential versus parliamentary forms of government. Compared to a social optimum as defined by the Samuelson condition for public-good provision and zero rents to the politicians, 17 they find deviations especially in three dimensions: the amount of public goods provided, redistributive transfers to politically powerful minorities, and rents to politicians. Which of the three is more pronounced depends on the particular constitutional combination.
18
16 We classify economics as a social science. See e.g. Frey (1999) . 17 See Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 254) . (Persson and Tabellini 2003) , more variables (e.g., total government spending, adjustments to shocks, deficits, and structural policies) are analyzed. But for simplicity we restrict ourselves to a selection and concentrate on the main variables discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2000) .
Especially in The Economic Effects of Constitutions
16
In a parliamentary regime the legislators of the majority coalition form the government and dictate the policy.
To sustain their electoral support they promote the joint interests of their voters and therefore concentrate spending on relatively broad-based programs such as public goods and general transfers. So the level of public-good provision is relatively close to the 'ideal level' characterized by the Samuelson condition, although the ideal level is not actually reached, as the majority coalition focuses only on its voters and not the whole population. But the relatively satisfactory level of public goods comes at the expense of large special-interest rents and large rents to politicians, as the government is largely unconstrained in privileging special-interest groups that are part of the majority coalition supporting the government, and there are only a few checks and balances that prevent rent extraction by politicians.
In presidential systems, in contrast, there is no firm parliamentary majority. Therefore powerful officeholders such as the heads of the US congressional committees dictate the agenda and try to play off one minority against another. Because of politicians promoting minority interests and the absence of a parliamentary majority, there are fewer incentives than in a parliamentary system to provide public goods, and a severe underprovision of public goods results. But on the other hand the presidential veto power allows for better prevention of rent seeking by special-interest groups and rent extraction by politicians than in a parliamentary system.
With respect to electoral rules the authors derive similar effects. A majoritarian electoral system leadscompared to a proportional electoral system -to increased competition between the political parties and helps therefore to restrict rent-seeking activities aiming at transfers to politically powerful minorities. But on the other hand more severe underprovision of public goods occurs, as spending is targeted only at the marginal districts (especially if the districts are small) while the safe districts are neglected. In proportional systems, on the other hand, more -and in particular more broad-based -spending can be expected (especially if districts are large), as all votes are equally important in the election. But competition and accountability are weaker, because representatives' efforts are internalized to a lesser extent and so rents to politicians tend to be larger.
Taking the effects together, a trade-off in between limiting rents to politicians and providing sufficient amounts of public goods results for the choice of the electoral rule as well as for the choice of the form of government.
17
The Economic Effects of Constitutions (Persson and Tabellini) Combining different electoral rules and forms of government leads to four main regimes, which are summarized in a simplified form in figure 1 .
In an extensive cross-sectional empirical analysis, Persson and Tabellini find their derived trade-offs at least partly supported (see, for a summary, Persson and Tabellini 2003, pp. 269 et sqq.) . The influence of electoral rules on public-good provision, rents to politicians, and rents to interest groups comes out fairly clearly. Concerning the form of government, they state that their empirical results are largely inconclusive.
III.3.2 A public-choice perspective on constitutional political economy
Compared to their work on integration and secession, the discussed political-economics contributions to constitutional political economy are far more convincing. Some of their empirical results are very interesting and enrich the existing literature with new findings.
So might political economics -based on its advances in the current literature -be able to replace public choice in constitutional political economy? To discuss this question we do not want to evaluate the described theory in detail, focus on uncovering possible weaknesses in the argument, or go into the details of the empirical analysis. Instead we find it -in this case -far more interesting to compare the proclaimed ends of the research with its results. Let us return to the introductory quotation of this section. Suppose that the British or Argentinean voters are confronted with the trade-offs identified by Persson and Tabellini and summarized in figure 1. What should they do? What is the assistance given to them by political economics? 18 Persson and Tabellini might say: 'Look, you are in a situation of second best. Switching from parliamentary to presidential democracy or from a majoritarian to a proportional system may not improve your situation. You may discover that you got out of the frying pan but straight into the fire and will never reach the social optimum as defined by the Samuelson condition and zero rents to the politicians, as you cannot avoid the principal-agent problem. Your political agent works under an incomplete contract, and there is nothing you can do about that. In a graphical exposition, you remain on an inner utility possibility frontier such as BB connecting the welfare of voters V 1 and V 2 depicted on the axes of figure 2a, and the only choice I can offer you is a bundle of alternative political systems CC. But consider that when departing from the status quo Q, you will always be confronted with a trade-off between e.g. securing public-good provision and limiting rents to politicians.'
From a public-choice view this approach of political economics looks completely static. All it says remains within given institutions. Nothing is said about institutional innovations. This is surprising, as especially constitutional analysis calls for a creative approach. The men and women who developed the Constitution in the French Revolution and the founding fathers of the American Constitution were characterized by this creativity. They could not have won their cause, had they merely concluded that the world is second best and cannot be improved. So why is the approach of political economics so conservative? We find the reason for this conservatism in its predominant reference to the political-science literature while the public-choice literature is largely neglected. Political science, according to the political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) , can be defined as follows:
Political science deals with the nature, the accumulation, the distribution, the exercise, and the control of power on all levels of social interaction, with special emphasis upon the power of the state.
According to this definition, political scientists ask: What are the institutions and constraints that allow the accumulation, distribution, exercise, and control of power here and now -and not under some alternative, not yet existing framework? And they focus on the coercive nature of the state. Political economics fits into this approach, as political scientists analyze how politicians decide when confronted with a set of wellknown alternative institutions. Choice is limited by the trade-off in the status quo.
Public-choice scholars, in contrast -working on the foundations laid especially by Buchanan -do not regard these trade-offs as inevitable constraints, but rather as challenges. If there is a social optimum beyond the constraint CC as claimed by Persson and Tabellini, there must also be an institutional arrangement to approach and eventually achieve it (see figure 2b) . Public-choice scholars typically ask the question: What can be done to go step by step from Q towards S? How can we improve institutions so that we come closer to the point S? For public choice the relevant question in constitutional analysis is not limited to what effects existing institutions have. They rather want to know: Which system has the effect that the government spends more when the citizens want higher spending and that it spends less when the citizens want lower spending?
Hence public choice focuses on suggestions for institutional improvements based on constitutional analysis. And luckily the improvements derived by public-choice theory could dissolve large parts of the basic trade-offs discussed so intensively by Persson and Tabellini, as the following examples may illustrate.
One example is the promotion of the concept of direct democracy by public choice: Complementing representative democracy with a referendum will have the effect that the government spends less (imposes lower taxes) when the citizens want lower spending. Likewise, a popular initiative will cause it to spend more if the voters want to have higher expenditures. Public-choice scholars have shown in empirical studies for different countries how referenda and initiatives have decisive effects on spending, taxation, and government debt as government discretion decreases and accountability is strengthened (see, for a survey, Kirchgässner, Feld, and Savioz (1999) and Matsusaka (2005) , who summarize some recent studies of the effects of direct democracy).
19 A second public-choice concept is decentralization of government. If labor and capital can migrate at low cost to other jurisdictions in a decentralized state, citizens have a larger say under decentralized than under centralized government. Public output becomes more adjusted to local preferences. And recent studies (Kirchgässner 2002) show that at least on the local level, on average no cost increases occur in smaller as compared to larger jurisdictions, and scale effects are therefore often negligible. Both concepts can hence be seen as important steps towards the social optimum identified by 20 Persson and Tabellini (see above), as their application helps to increase the supply of public goods to the level demanded by the citizens and to restrict the rents of politicians by giving a larger say to the voters.
But public choice has not only derived complementary improvements for existing political systems, but has fundamentally challenged the view that constitutional choice is limited to majoritarian versus proportional electoral rules and presidential versus parliamentary forms of government. Gordon Tullock has offered one basic alternative by a simple vote-transfer mechanism (1967): Every adult person is a member of the parliament (as in a popular assembly). But citizens can transfer their vote to a person whom they expect to have nearly the same preferences and to vote as she would vote herself. Those who go to parliament will vote with as many votes as they have received. In this case the advantages of personality vote (in the approach of political economics restricted to a majoritarian system) can be combined with those of proportional representation. Accountability increases in that candidates' shirking can be observed. As representatives are linked more closely to their voters, the transmission of preferences into politics will be less distorted. Under such a regime, representatives would not necessarily join a fixed coalition, but rather aim at increasing their reelection probability by voting issue by issue as closely as possible to their voters' preferences. And the government would no longer be either parliamentary or presidential (in the American sense). The parliament may rather appoint an executive board (like the Federal Council in Switzerland), or the citizens elect a president whose function is to arrange compromises and majorities in the parliament. To prevent free-riding, exploitation of minorities, and cycling, the parliament could decide by qualified majority rule or by one of the simple voting procedures such as voting by veto (Mueller 1978 (Mueller , 1984 or Hylland-Zeckhauser's point voting procedure (Hylland-Zeckhauser 1979) , so that the decisions come closer to those under unanimity rule without causing high transactions costs. Taken together, the vote-transfer mechanism, an executive board in the parliament, and a voting procedure such as voting by veto would lead to political outcomes continuously closer to the social optimum than in any of the political systems discussed by Persson and Tabellini (for further details see Mueller 2002, 2004 ).
Hence we conclude that the contribution of political economics to the study of constitutional political economy is strictly limited to research on the status quo and therefore far from displacing public choice. In particular, the voluntary monophthalmia of political economics in disregarding public choice almost completely has prevented it from facing the central and most important question in constitutional political economy: how to design a constitution that assures the best possible alignment of public policy with 19 Indeed, the political-economics community seems to be not totally unaware of this. In a footnote, Persson and Tabellini (2003, p. 5 ) quote one older study by Pommerehne and Frey (1978) , but come to the surprising statement that only very limited research has been conducted along these lines.
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individual preferences. This calls for criticism especially in that innovation in governments is clearly required.
IV POLITICAL ECONOMICS VERSUS PUBLIC CHOICE
IV.1 Political economics versus public choice -a paradigm shift?
So what are the results of our preceding analysis of political economics and public choice with respect to the paradigmatic competition of the two approaches? Is political economics going to replace public choice? Is a paradigm shift observable?
Based on our analysis in section III of this paper, we can summarize:
1. Political economics deserves praise for the integration of rational expectations into political businesscycle models, although the empirical record of these models is not necessarily more convincing than that of public-choice models.
2. The political-economics literature on the size of nations, however, has turned out to be far less persuasive. On normative grounds the idea of an optimal size of nations seems to be misplaced. It rests on a collective optimization of country size and is therefore undemocratic. As states are considered to be organic entities, options offered by fiscal federalism are forsaken. On positive grounds, the assumption of exogeneity of the trade regime leads to inconsistent predictions inferior to even the simplest hypotheses of public choice. And suggestions for institutional improvements enhancing welfare can hardly be derived, as the central policy variable -trade -is exogenous.
3. In constitutional political economy the achievements of political economics are also not outstanding.
They focus almost exclusively on trade-offs within existing representative democracies and miss the central question of constitutional analysis: how to secure the alignment of public policy with individual preferences. Therefore political economics is not able to replace public choice in this field either.
Altogether, there is no indication of a paradigm shift: Political economics cannot explain what was explained before by public choice and new facts as well. Quite the contrary seems to be true: Public-choice explanations continue to be more convincing in central fields of analysis common to both approaches. This is especially true of the newer contributions of political economics, which ignore public-choice research almost completely.
20 Much more creative than the works by Persson and Tabellini is the book by Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1999) , The Grabbing Hand, in which the authors are searching for superior institutional designs for privatization, for prevention of corruption, and to support market-oriented politicians in foreign-aid policy. This would be a way to go. But even given that political economics does not qualify as a paradigm on its own, it still separates itself from public choice, and the two approaches remain in competition. So what is the current score of the two approaches in this competition if we compare them more generally?
IV.2 Political economics versus public choice -general comparison
The comparison of the research in political economics and public choice reveals especially three basic differences that distinguish the two approaches, leading to different questions, different research designs, and consequently different analytical results: their point of reference, the importance they assign to individual liberty, and their attitude to modeling techniques. 22 Exact quotation: 'The 'new' political economist would benefit from a little bit of academic restraint and integrity by admitting that the term 'new' refers to their being relatively new in the field because it took them some time to realize and to admit that, to paraphrase Nietzsche, the benevolent dictator is dead (Ursprung 2003, p. 225 Public-choice scholars on the other hand argue that efficiency considerations are not sufficient. They assign the greatest importance to the value of individual liberty and its promotion as a criterion to evaluate political decisions and institutions. The extent of liberty as being free from willed constraints and the ability of individuals to avoid being forced are the criteria, which follow directly from the focus on voluntary exchange. A typical question asked by public choice is therefore how we can improve the institutions of representative democracy to increase individual liberty and limit exploitation of minorities by majorities (see, e.g., Buchanan and Congleton 1998) . In political economics, in contrast, the link between economic analysis and liberty is missing. Therefore its conclusions for public policy are, despite the integration of political processes, often not much different from those of a benevolent dictator. Public choice, however, integrates a calculus of individual liberties and comes therefore to largely different questions, results, and advice.
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Third, methodological determination versus methodological openness: Finally political economics is built at least partly on methodological characteristics. For Persson and Tabellini the approach of political economics is to study 'some of the classic problems in public choice", adopting a general-equilibrium approach with explicit micropolitical foundations -meaning that economic behavior and political behavior are derived from the same individual preferences (see Persson and Tabellini 2000, pp. 3 et sqq.) . In contrast with political economics, researchers in public choice have always rejected the idea that the discipline is defined by the analytical tools or techniques they use and focused instead on the questions they wanted to answer.
The dedication of political economics to technical concerns makes it especially vulnerable to favoring analytical refinements over practical applicability. Modeling becomes an end in itself, and the application of political economics to politics moves as far from reality as that of classical mainstream economics, which has always been criticized by public-choice scholars for its lack of practical applicability.
IV.3 A head start for public choice
We have argued that political economics can hardly be seen as a paradigm on its own. But nonetheless it separates itself and competes with public choice. So how can we evaluate the 'current score' of the competition between these two approaches? We propose to compare the results of the two approaches with respect to their common scientific goal (see section IV.1): to derive normative implications for institutional improvements. 24 Are the two approaches on a par with respect to this goal, or does one have an advantage?
In analyzing political business cycles, political economics has -based on the research of public choicecontributed very successfully and derived important new suggestions for institutional improvements. The success of political economics with respect to political business cycles, however, may have nourished the fallacious opinion that all that is necessary to take over the role of public choice is technical problem solving. A few more 'formal game-theoretic tools' combined with 'the equilibrium approach of macroeconomic theory' is enough to replace the public-choice tradition, and the foundations of the public-choice approach such as the importance of liberty and choice are only of minor relevance.
Unfortunately, this belief has blurred the perspective of the political-economics research and led to unconvincing results. As we have demonstrated above, the newer contributions of political economics on integration and secession (section III.2) and constitutional political economy (section III.3) have been unable to provide any meaningful advice for institutional innovations -their explicitly declared scientific goal.
24 See, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (1990, pp. 2 et sqq.) ; Buchanan (1975, pp. 389 et sqq.) .
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The causal factors for this decline of political-economics research were identified above in its inability to define a relevant point of reference outside of the given institutional setting (e.g., outside the existing western representative democracies), its concentration on the coercive character of the state, and its preference for efficiency considerations over concerns for individual liberty. Public-choice scholars, on the other hand -with Wicksell as their point of reference and individual choice and liberty as their main criteria -were much better able to derive advice for institutional improvements, e.g., in constitutional political economy (section III.3).
Hence, measured by their common scientific goal to derive normative implications for institutional improvements, we still see an edge for public choice in the economic analysis of politics.
Nonetheless, there is an ongoing competition that can only benefit both approaches of political economy.
Solely looking in the queen's mirror will bring neither public choice nor political economics forward.
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